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Abstract
The problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much ac-
ademic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust
and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanction-
ing institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further
explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information
which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This
model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic con-
figurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the
dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the se-
quential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of
placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. More-
over, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced
authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.
Introduction
Trust is a critical social factor which is considered to be highly conducive to preventing oppor-
tunistic behaviour, decreasing transaction costs and maintaining cooperation in human activi-
ties [1–5]. Traditional game theoretic analysis of trust is usually built upon a standard trust
game as shown in Fig 1 [6–11]. In the trust game, “not placing trust” is the rational individual
action in a one-shot game [12]. This is a suboptimal social outcome because “placing trust,
honouring trust” is a strict improvement for both the trustor and the trustee. From this point
of view, Fig 1 concisely illustrates a paradigmatic social dilemma in human society, where R1,
S1, P1 denote the utility of the trustor and R2, T2, P2 denote the utility of the trustee.
However, the traditional trust game has limitations of analysing hierarchical interactions in
complex systems. In particular, what is missing in the traditional model is a dynamic perspec-
tive which distinguishes different types of trust. In many conventional studies, trust is a con-
cept at the individual or interpersonal level [13]. Some scholars focus on interpretations of one
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single type of trust such as inter-personal relationships in which trust is a stationary result
under certain socio-economic conditions [14–23]. Others highlight the sources of trust and
trace them back to the process of interactions or characteristics and competence of individuals
[24–26]. Yet if one analyses the problem of trust in more complex contexts, then it is important
to recognize that it involves interactions between more than just individuals [27]. Consider
common-pool resource (CPR) governance in a large-scale social-ecological system (SES), it is
evident that trust should be attributed to a variety of relationships between multiple groups, or-
ganizations and institutions. Under diverse social, economic, political and spatial-temporal
conditions, noticeably, an actor has to measure his belief not only in the trustworthiness of his
peer actors, but also in institutions and governance agencies which influence collective and in-
dividual behaviour through external intervention. These trust relationships are beyond social-
psychological understandings of inter-personal activities. Against the backdrop of increasing
complexity, the problem of trust thus should be examined through an alternative structure
which integrates interactions between actors at different levels.
From the perspective of rational choice theory, formal models and experiments have been de-
veloped to investigate dynamics and mechanisms of trust relationships [10,28,29]. Built on dy-
adic interactions between different actors, these theoretical and experimental studies have
shown that reciprocity and peer punishment can facilitate trust in social dilemmas [12,30,31].
However, the major limitation of these models is that they are established on a horizontal actor-
network in which only individual trust is examined. One should notice that peer punishment on
defectors through reciprocity is difficult in more complicated systems [32,33]. Recently, scholars
have started raising questions in regard to “the ability of spontaneous, uncoordinated and decen-
tralized peer punishment to sustain cooperation in complex societies”. Based on experiments of
public good games (PGG), some scholars argue that peer punishment might be only effective
under conditions such that the group size is sufficiently small or exit option is provided to par-
ticipants [34–37]. In empirical settings of CPR governance, we frequently observe centralized in-
stitutions which impose top-down sanctions to prevent opportunistic behaviour. Some
experimental evidence derived from PGG also has shown that centralized sanctioning system
can promote human cooperation and be more efficient than peer punishment due to its ability
to overcome coordination failure and free-riding problems [38–40].
Fig 1. Extensive form of the Trust Game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.g001
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This paper engages in discussions about peer punishment and centralized sanctioning by
developing a formal iterative two-level trust game with incomplete information. More specifi-
cally, it proposes a hierarchical structure which not only simultaneously includes individual
trust and institutional trust, but also examines how centralized sanctioning might affect reci-
procity between the trustor and the trustee. In each period of the newly proposed game, an au-
thority who moves after the trustee is added. If the trustee honoured trust, then the focal period
of the game ends; if the trustee abused trust, then a choice is granted to the authority, who can
either impose a costly punishment on the defective trustee or not punish the defection. Mean-
while, information is incomplete in the sense that actors are not fully informed on other actors’
utility functions and preferences. Note the hierarchical structure and the role of the authority
in this paper differ from those in previous literature on altruistic third-party punishment and
human cooperation [41–49]. In our model, the authority engages in repeated interactions rath-
er than a one-shot game. In addition, the authority’s total utilities are dependent on his own
and other actors’ behaviour. Thus he is considered a strategic purposive actor rather than an al-
truist who gains no economic benefits from costly punishment. Therefore, the configurations
of this model do not intend to examine human altruism; instead, we focus on how centralized
sanctioning institutions and incomplete information may affect reciprocity at the individual
level. This extension could improve the applicability of the two-level trust game in more com-
plex settings. By linking equilibrium strategies of the traditional trust game with those of the
newly proposed model, one could compare the effects of centralized sanctioning and peer pun-
ishment on trust and reciprocity.
This paper is organized as follows. First, a two-level trust game which is built upon the tradi-
tional baseline trust game is introduced. Then, the sequential equilibrium is formally derived
for the two-level trust game under a scenario in which information is incomplete about both
the trustee and the authority. Finally, the paper concludes with theoretical and empirical impli-
cations of the two-level trust game.
Method
The baseline trust game with incomplete information
The formal game theoretic analysis begins with a review of a baseline model which is built
upon the trust game presented in Fig 1 [7,10,50,51]. The baseline model includes two impor-
tant features. The first one is a move by nature, before the game starts, deciding which type of
trustee will participate in the game (see Fig 2). This entails that it is assumed two types of trust-
ees exist in nature—the G-type (good) and the B-type (bad). Both types of trustees are utility
maximisers. Yet they have different preferences. The G-type trustees have stronger altruistic
tendencies and therefore always feel more satisfied by honouring trust than abusing trust. On
the contrary, the B-type trustees have stronger selfish tendencies and therefore prefer abusing
trust than honouring trust in a one-shot game. This is a plausible assumption as it reflects the
coexistence of opportunists and altruists in empirical settings [52–54]. The trustee knows his
type, yet information is incomplete in the sense that, at the beginning of the game, the trustor
does not know which type of trustee will be his counterpart. Let π1
E be the probability that the
trustor assigns at the beginning of the game to the event that the trustee is a G-type.
The second feature is a continuation of the game. The game is finitely repeated without the
assumption of discounting utilities. Hence the total utility any actor receives during the game is
the total undiscounted sum of utility that he obtains in each game period. Moreover, anyone in
this game knows exactly how many periods will last in the game.
Under circumstances of complete information, backward induction informs us that no trust
should be placed in finitely repeated trust games if the trustor knew he would encounter a B-
Two-Level Trust Game
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type trustee; however, with slight uncertainties about the type of the trustee, the outcome of the
game would have been substantially changed in a way that even B-type trustees might honour
trust in early periods of the game. The sequential equilibrium of the baseline trust game with
incomplete information consists of three phases; namely, stable trust, randomization and no
trust [51,55]. Bower, Garber, and Watson (1996) provided a comprehensive proof of this se-
quential equilibrium when the baseline trust game is played twice. To avoid complexity and en-
sure consistency in the following analysis, the results for the two-period baseline game are
summarised in Table 1, where the notations are defined as follows:
w1 & w2 = probabilities that the trustor A1 places trust at period I & II.
r1 & r2 = probabilities that the B-type trustee A2 honours trust at period I & II.
Fig 2. Extensive form of a baseline trust game with incomplete information.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.g002
Table 1. Sequential equilibria for the baseline trust game.
Case Equilibrium strategies
1. pE1 >
S1
R1S1
w1 = r1 = w2 = r2 = 1
2. pE1 ¼ S1R1S1 w1 = r1 = 1; w2 (T2—R2)/T2
3. S1R1S1
 2
< pE1 <
S1
R1S1
w1 ¼ 1; r1 ¼ pE1 =S1ð1 pE1 Þ;w2 ¼ ðT2  R2Þ=T2
4. pE1 ¼ S1R1S1
 2 w1 ¼ 1; r1 ¼ pE1 =S1ð1 pE1 Þ;w2  ðT2  R2Þ=T2
5. pE1 <
S1
R1S1
 2 w1 = w2 = 0
Source: adapted from (Bower, et al., 1996). For analytical simplicity, it is assumed that P1 = P2 = 0 when no
trust is placed, and hence S1<0. π1
E is common knowledge.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.t001
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This result exhibits that whether the trustor places trust is mainly dependent on his ex ante
belief about the probability that the trustee is a G-type, the number of periods to be played and
the RISK for him to place trust, where RISK = S1/(S1-R1) [55]. Therefore, it is easy to conclude
that the first (trust) phase of the model will be longer under three conditions; namely, a higher
ex ante probability that the trustee is a G-type, a larger number of periods to be played and a
smaller risk of placing trust for the trustor.
The two-level Trust game with incomplete information
The two-level trust game is an extension of the baseline model (see Fig 3). The term “two-level”
emphasises a hierarchical structure and a newly introduced actor—the authority.
Let the trustor, the trustee and the authority be named by the order of their actions as A1
and A2 and A3. In a focal period of the two-level trust game, the authority would receive a re-
ward R3 if trust was placed and honoured; nevertheless, if trust was placed and abused, then the
authority would not receive the reward R3 and he must make a binary choice between punish-
ing (C) and not punishing (D) the defective trustee. By punishing defective trustees, the author-
ity A3 can impose a punishment ψ on them. This punishment is costly for the authority as it
associates with a negative cost C3. The punishment will not change the utility of the trustor;
however, it reduces the utility of the defective trustee to T2-ψ. It is assumed that (T2-ψ)<R2 and
hence a rational trustee would not have abused trust if he knew that he was going to be pun-
ished. In the baseline model, the type of the trustee is unknown to the trustor at the beginning
of the game. Likewise, it is sensible to make a similar assumption about the type of the authori-
ty. Namely, two types of authorities are assumed to co-exist in nature—an altruistic G-type
who always prefer to punish defective trustees and an opportunistic B-type who are reluctant
to punish if it was only a one-shot game. It is assumed that R3+C3>0 and thus the B-type A3
has an incentive to bear a short-term cost for a long-term reward in repeated interactions. It is
continued to assume P1 = P2 = P3 = 0 when no trust is placed for analytical simplicity.
Fig 3. Extensive form of a two-level trust game with incomplete information.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.g003
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Results
In this section, the sequential equilibrium strategies for all actors in the two-level trust game
are derived. Let πn
E and πn
A respectively denote the probabilities assigned to the event that the
trustee A2 and the authority A3 are a G-type at period n, where the subscript n denotes the peri-
od of the game. Note that πn
E and πn
A are common knowledge. For analytical simplicity, the
game is assumed to be played twice (n = 1, 2) and there will be no discounted utilities in the
game. To derive the sequential equilibrium of the game, this paper follows the approach devel-
oped by Bower, et al. (1996). Each decision node on the game tree is indexed and worked back-
wards starting with the second period.
Node 6: Period II, A3’s decision when A2 abused trust
There are two types of A3. The G-type A3 surely punishes. The B-type A3 surely defects because
the game will immediately end after A3’s action and there will be no future utilities to offset the
B-type A3’s costs for punishing. It is a unique equilibrium continuation.
Node 5: Period II, A2’s decision to honour or abuse when trusted by A1
There are two types of A2. The G-type A2 always honours trust. The B-type A2 honours trust
only if his expected utilities for choosing C are larger than those of choosing D. In other words,
the B-type A2 honours trust when the authority is sufficiently trustworthy and the punishment
on defectors is sufficiently high.
Mathematically that is,R2 > p
A
2 ðT2  cÞ þ ð1 pA2 ÞT2, and algebra yields,
pA2 >
T2  R2
c
ð1Þ
Otherwise, the B-type A2 abuses trust. Note that the B-type A2 may randomize with proba-
bility r2 2 [0,1] when pA2 ¼ ðT2  R2Þ=c.
Node 4: Period II, A1’s decision to place trust or not
A1 only places trust when his expected utilities for placing trust are larger than zero, the latter
of which is his expected utilities for not placing trust in period II. Different from the baseline
model, now A1’s expected utilities not only depend on the probability that A2 is a G-type who
will honour trust for sure, they also depend on the probability that A3 is a G-type who will pun-
ish the B-type A2; in the latter case, even the B-type A2 might honour trust in the last round of
the game given that there is a high belief that A3 would punish A2 should he abused trust. In
other words, A1 will place trust if either the probability that A2 is a G-type or the probability
that A3 is a G-type is sufficiently high.
It is already established in the analysis of Node 4 that the B-type A2 honours trust on condi-
tion of Inequality (1). Thus, it is clear that A1 will place trust when π2
A>(T2-R2)/ψ. In addition,
A1 will also place trust if he believes the trustee is sufficiently trustworthy even when Inequality
(1) is not satisfied. That is to say although the B-type A2 surely defects, A1 will place trust when
pE2R1 þ ð1 pE2ÞS1 > 0, and algebra yields
pE2 >
S1
S1  R1
ð2Þ
Two-Level Trust Game
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513 April 16, 2015 6 / 14
Note that A1 may randomize with probability w2 2 [0,1] when π2E = S1/(S1-R1). Here the
first two-level outcome is reached; namely, the trustor A1 will place trust at period II if either
Inequality (1) or (2) is satisfied.
Node 3: Period I, A3’s decision to punish or not when A2 defected
Node 3 is only reached when the trustee A2 abused trust in period I, which suggests A2 is B-
type and π2
E = 0. At node 3, the G-type A3 always punishes. Note that if the B-type A3 did not
punish the defective A2 in period I, then it would be revealed that A3 is B-type too, which leads
to π2
A = 0 as well as zero utility for all actors in period II. The B-type A3 would, however, pun-
ish only if his expected utilities in period II are no smaller than his costs for punishing the de-
fective A2 in period I.
Suppose in equilibrium a B-type A3 chooses to punish with a probability qr. Note that by
Bayes’ rule,
pA2 ¼
pA1
pA1 þ ð1 pA1 Þqr
ð3Þ
Let qr be defined by
T2  R2
c
¼ p
A
1
pA1 þ ð1 pA1 Þqr
and thus
qr 
pA1 ðcþ R2  T2Þ
ðT2  R2Þð1 pA1 Þ
ð4Þ
In the following it is shown by contradiction that qr is the equilibrium value of qr.
If qr>qr, then π2
A<(T2-R2)/ψ and the B-type A3’s continuation utility in period II would be
zero; because, A1 knew that A2 would have abused trust if A1 places trust in period II, therefore
A1 would not place trust in the first place and everyone receives zero in the second round. In
this case, the B-type A3 would strictly prefer choosing not to punish in period I, which implies
qr = 0 (a contradiction).
If qr<qr, then π2
A>(T2-R2)/ψ and the B-type A3 expects a continuation utility of R3 in peri-
od II; because A1 knew that A2 would have honoured trust if A1 places trust in the first place.
Thus the trust would be placed and honoured in period II. Given it was stipulated that R3 is
strictly larger than the cost for a B-type A3 to punish defective A2, the B-type A3 then strictly
prefers choosing to punish, which implies qr = 1 (a contradiction).
Furthermore, the randomization probabilities for A1 and A2 in equilibrium, when π2
E = S1/
(S1-R1) and π2
A = (T2-R2)/ψ, are selected such that the actors who respectively move prior to A1
and A2 are indifferent in the periods before [55]. For A2, the trustor A1 must be indifferent be-
tween placing and not placing trust, that is, r2R1+(1-r1)S1 = 0 and thus r2 = S1/(S1-R1); for A1,
the authority must be indifferent between imposing and not imposing punishment, that is
w2r2R3+C3 = 0. Replacing r2 with S1/(S1-R1) and simple algebra yields w2 = C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1). In
a nutshell, the randomization probability cannot be either too high or too low to alter the
choice of the actor who moves in the period before.
Two-Level Trust Game
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Node 2: Period I, A2’s decision to honour or abuse trust when trust is
placed
The G-type A2 always cooperates. With regard to the strategy for the B-type A2, one needs to
consider a two-level deduction. More specifically, the B-type A2 now simultaneously faces an
internal and an external factor that influence his choice of action. The internal factor is peer
punishment which might be imposed on the B-type A2 and reduces his potential long-term
benefits. The peer punishment might drive the B-type A2 pretend to be a G-type. This is a well-
established notion according to the baseline model and it has been tested by many laboratory
experiments [12,56]. The external factor, on the other hand, is introduced by the imposition of
the authority. In this two-level trust game, it is a centralized sanctioning institution and an
extra constrain on possible defective behaviours of the B-type A2. Therefore, the B-type A2 has
another motivation to cooperate in addition to his concern for peer punishment.
The centralized sanctioning is reflected by A2’s expected utilities. He will honour trust if his
expected utilities for choosing C are no smaller than choosing D at period I. That is,
R2 > ðT2  cÞpA1 þ ð1 pA1 Þqr ðT2  cÞ þ ð1 pA1 Þð1 qr ÞT2
replace qr with Eq (4) and algebra yields,
pA1 >
T2  R2
c
 2
ð5Þ
When Inequality (5) cannot be satisfied, the scenario can be simply viewed as a baseline
model in which the authority does not exist. It basically suggests that the authority is so un-
trustworthy to such extent that π1
A<[(T2-R2)/ψ]
2. In this case, the B-type A2 may randomize
with probability r1 2 [0,1]in equilibrium as proved by Buskens [55] and Bower et al. [51]. The
process of randomization probability selection is similar to what has been shown in the analysis
of Node 3. Without further duplication, the randomization probability is,
r1 ¼
pE1R1
ðpE1  1ÞS1
ð6Þ
Node 1: Period I, A1’s decision to place trust or not
Similar to the analysis of Node 4, A1 chooses to place trust under two circumstances. One is
that the B-type trustee honours trust given their anticipation that there is a sufficiently high
probability the authority will punish. This condition is illustrated by the analysis of Node 2 and
Inequality (5). When Inequality (5) cannot be satisfied, or to put it another way, when the
authority’s trustworthiness does not reach an adequate level, an alternative condition for the
trust placement is that the probability that the trustee is a G-type is sufficiently high. This is
clearly true when π1
E>S1/(S1-R1). If π1
ES1/(S1-R1), then it implies
pE1R1 þ ð1 pE1Þr1R1 þ ð1 pE1Þð1 r1ÞS1 > 0
Substitution of r1 according to Eq (6) and algebra yields
pE1 <
S1
R1  S1
 2
ð7Þ
Two-Level Trust Game
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Therefore, A1 places trust with certainty at period I when either Inequality (5) or Inequality
(7) is satisfied. There will be no trust placement if neither inequality can be satisfied.
To sum up, the sequential equilibrium of the two-level trust game inherits characteristics of
the baseline model. In particular, π1
E (Actors’ ex ante belief in the probability that the trustee
A2 is a G-type) and RISK still constitute important factors for trust. In addition, new features
have been developed. π1
A (Actors’ ex ante belief in the probability that the authority A3 is a G-
type) and an alternative version of temptation, TEMPP = (T2-R2)/ψ (recall that TEMP = (T2-
R2)/T2), are incorporated into the equilibrium. It should be noted that the ex ante beliefs in the
probability that A2 and A3 is a G-type respectively fall into five categories as illustrated in
Table 2. These five categories are labelled as Full optimism (FO), High optimism (HO), Inter-
mediate optimism (IO), High pessimism (HP) and Full pessimism (FP) with a descending de-
gree of confidence in A2 and A3 being a G-type.
The incomplete information about both the trustee and the authority reconstructs the base-
line trust game. The result of the newly proposed two-level trust game suggests that the equilib-
rium strategies for both the trustor and B-type actors are altered. There are 25 cases which
involve different combinations of ex ante beliefs in the types of the trustee and the authority.
The equilibrium strategies for the trustor, the B-type trustee and the B-type authority in each
scenario are summarized in Table 3.
Case I-V. When π1
A = FO, the actors are initially very optimistic about the authority’s
type. In this case, maximum trust and reciprocity can be achieved regardless of actors’ ex ante
beliefs in the trustee. The sequential equilibrium only includes pure strategies in the sense that
the trustor places trust and the trust is honoured in both periods. Even the B-type trustee hon-
ours trust in the last period of the game. The authority enjoys the reward for the establishment
of trust without entering the game. These cases yield the highest group utilities for all actors.
Case VI-X. When π1
A =HO, the actors are still optimistic about the authority’s type, but
their equilibrium strategies might vary. The trustor will place trust in both periods if π1
E = FO
given it indicates his full confidence in the trustee. He will otherwise place trust in period I and
randomize with a high probability in period II regardless of his ex ante beliefs in the trustee.
On the other hand, the B-type trustee will always honour trust in Period I and always random-
ize in period II. His randomization probability is determined by a polynomial which represents
the risk for the trustor to place trust.
Case VI-X. When π1
A = IO, it implies an intermediate degree of optimism about the
authority’s type. The trustor will place trust in both periods if he is fully confident in the trustee
(π1
E = FO) and he will randomize in period II otherwise. His randomization probability is de-
termined by a polynomial consists of various parameters such as his risk for placing trust, the
Table 2. Categories for the two-level trust gamewith incomplete information about both the authority
and the trustee.
Category I: Belief that A3 is a G-
type
Category II: Belief that A2 is a G-
type
Description
pA1 >
T2R2
c p
E
1 >
S1
R1S1
Full optimism (FO)
pA1 ¼ T2R2c pE1 ¼ S1R1S1 High optimism (HO)
T2R2
c
 2
< pA1 <
T2R2
c
S1
R1S1
 2
< pE1 <
S1
R1S1
Intermediate optimism
(IO)
pA1 ¼ T2R2c
 2
pE1 ¼ S1R1S1
 2 High pessimism (HP)
pA1 <
T2R2
c
 2
pE1 <
S1
R1S1
 2 Full pessimism (FP)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.t002
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costs C3 for the authority to impose punishment and the rewards R3 for the authority if trust is
placed and honoured. The B-type trustee will surely cooperate in period I and always defect in
period II considering the ex ante belief in the authority’s type is not sufficiently high.
Case XVI-XX. When π1
A =HP, the actors are generally pessimistic about the authority’s
type. However, trust can be still placed and honoured in period I if π1
E is relatively high; be-
cause, the B-type trustee has incentives to pretend to be a G-type in order to receive higher
long-term benefits. If the degree of optimism about the trustee’s type is intermediate or rela-
tively low, the B-type trustee will randomize in Period I and always abuse trust in Period II.
The B-type authority will also randomize if the trustee abused in Period I. The trustor may also
place trust with a probability in Period II. There will be no trust until the trustor stops placing
trust or trust is abused and defection is unpunished.
Case XXI-XXV. When π1
A = FP, it implies that the actors are fully pessimistic about the
authority’s type. The game then turns into a scenario similar to the baseline game in the sense
that the authority barely has any impact over the actors’ choices of action. Basically, the se-
quential equilibrium strategies for the trustor and the B-type trustee are similar to what is pre-
sented in Table 1.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented a two-level trust game with incomplete information. This two-level
configuration introduces several new features and it depicts a hierarchical structure of interac-
tions in which the effects of centralized sanctioning on trust and reciprocity can be examined.
Many new insights have been developed from the game theoretic analysis of the two-level
trust game.
Firstly, the sequential equilibrium of our model simultaneously includes both the risk for
placing trust (RISK) and the temptation for abusing trust (TEMPP) as key factors for coopera-
tion at the individual level. This is an important advancement because traditional formal mod-
els only include one of them as a key factor for cooperation in social dilemmas. For instance,
the Perfect Folk Theorem explains cooperation with indefinitely repeated games. It suggests
Table 3. Sequential equilibrium strategies for the two-level Trust game.
Case Belief in the
authority
Belief in the trustee Equilibrium Strategies
I-V π1
A = FO π1
E = FO, HO, IO, HP,
FP
w1 = r1 = w2 = r2 = 1;
VI-X π1
A = HO π1
E = FO w1 = r1 = w2 = 1; r2 = S1/(S1-R1)
π1
E = HO, IO, HP, FP w1 = r1 = 1; w2  C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2 = S1/(S1-R1)
XI-XV π1
A = IO π1
E = FO w1 = r1 = w2 = 1; r2 = 0
π1
E = HO w1 = r1 = 1; w2C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2 = 0
π1
E = IO, HP, FP w1 = r1 = 1; w2 = C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2 = 0
XVI-XX π1
A = HP π1
E = FO w1 = r1 = w2 = 1; r2 = 0
π1
E = HO w1 = r1 = 1; w2C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2 = 0
π1
E = IO, HP, FP w1 = 1; r1 = π1
ER1/(S1-π1
ES1); qr = π1
A(ψ+R2-T2)/[(T2- R2)(1-π1
A)]; w2 = C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2
= 0
XXI-XXV π1
A = FP π1
E = FO w1 = r1 = w2 = 1; r2 = 0
π1
E = HO w1 = r1 = 1; w2C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2 = 0
π1
E = IO, HP w1 = 1; r1 = π1
ER1/(S1-π1
ES1); qr = π1
A(ψ+R2-T2)/[(T2- R2)(1-π1
A)]; w2 = C3(R1-S1)/(R3S1); r2
= 0
π1
E = FP w1 = w2 = 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124513.t003
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that rational actors might cooperate in social dilemmas as long as the discounting factor β is
sufficiently large when compared to TEMP. The baseline trust game explains cooperation with
incomplete information. As shown in Table 1, RISK plays a much more important role than
TEMP in determining the length of cooperation period in the baseline trust game. Although
these two mechanisms (indefinitely repetition and incomplete information) are well-known
for bringing about cooperation in social dilemmas, no previous formal models have simulta-
neously incorporated TEMP and RISK into critical conditions for cooperation. The proposed
two-level model, however, reaches such an integrated result as indicated by Inequalities 5
and 7.
Secondly, the two-level trust game provides an opportunity to compare its equilibrium strat-
egies with those of the baseline model in which no overarching authority participates. This
comparison leads to an interesting postulation suggesting that even a slight uncertainty about
the authority’s type might significantly increase the level of trust and reciprocity at the individ-
ual level. In previous laboratory experiments, scholars often observe a decrease of trustworthi-
ness in the last few rounds of the baseline trust game. This phenomenon is referred as the end-
game effect [29]. Yet in some cases of the two-level trust game, full trustfulness and full trust-
worthiness can be obtained such that the end-game effect can be alleviated. This is mainly due
to two reasons. One is that the conditions for trust placement is relaxed—a high trustworthi-
ness of either the trustee or the authority is sufficient for the trustor to place trust. The other
reason is that the condition for the B-type trustee to honour trust is relaxed. Specifically, the
imposition of the authority creates an additional incentive for the B-type trustee to pretend to
be a G-type since he is afraid to be punished when the ex ante belief π1
A is sufficiently high.
Therefore, the incomplete information with regard to the type of the authority reshapes each
actor’s equilibrium strategies. It produces favourably impacts on conditions for trust
and reciprocity.
Lastly, the two-level set up of the trust game brings new factors, including ψ, R3 and C3, into
the baseline model. They all have different effects on the sequential equilibrium. The amount
of centralized sanction imposed on defective trustees plays a key role in determining equilibri-
um strategies for both the trustor and the trustee. When the ex ante beliefs are common knowl-
edge and fixed, the harsher the sanction is the more likely trust is placed and honoured. Yet the
utilities associated with the authority’s reward R3 and costs C3 only play a peripheral role of de-
termining the randomization period for the trustor.
Despite the above theoretical interest in the effects of centralized sanctioning and incom-
plete information on human cooperation, empirical evidence testing these theories is limited.
Pluralistic methods, including experimental approaches, are needed to develop more compre-
hensive, accurate and well-specified explanations of these game theoretic postulations [57,58].
Testable hypotheses could be generated from the formal two-level trust game and examined in
experiments in future research. For instance, Buskens et al. [29,55,59] and Anderhub et al. [30]
have analysed, in experimental settings, the sequential equilibrium of the baseline trust game
with two or three actors [6,51,60]. An important finding from these studies is the end-game ef-
fect. The analyses of our two-level trust game, however, suggests that the end-game effect may
be weakened by the imposition of a centralized sanctioning institution and incomplete infor-
mation. This leads to the following hypotheses: 1) In the condition of the two-level trust game,
compared to the condition of the baseline trust game, the likelihood of trustworthiness of the
trustor and trustworthiness of the trustee is higher; 2) The likelihood of trustfulness and trust-
worthiness decrease slower in the last few rounds of the two-level trust game than that in the
baseline trust game. By moderate modifications to previous experimental configurations by
Buskens et al. and Anderhub et al., one could test these hypotheses and compare the effects of
centralized sanctioning on trust and reciprocity in alternative lab experiments.
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To put the two-level model in a broader context, it could shed some light on two interrelated
types of trust; namely, individual trust between the trustor and trustee as well as institutional
trust between the individuals and the authority. The result of the two-level game demonstrates
that the imposition of an authority produces a synergetic effect on trust and reciprocity. This
result, to some extent, echoes with extensive arguments concerning the relationship between
“trust in the state” and “social trust” [14,61–63]. Future research could further explore such
conjectures with more empirical evidence collected in the field.
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